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THE BRIBED CONGRESSMAN'S IMMUNITY
FROM PROSECUTION
Tim Constitution promotes free discussion in Congress through a
provision that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Members of
Congress] shall not be questioned in any other place."' During the
present term, the Supreme Court will consider for the first time
whether this clause bars prosecution of a Congressman who received
money for delivering a speech on the floor of the House.2
The Government indicted Congressman Thomas F. Johson on
eight counts for receiving compensation from, and performing services
for, certain Maryland savings and loan institutions. The first count
charged a violation of a statute making it a crime to conspire "to de-
fraud the United States." 3 The conspiracy consisted of an attempt to
influence the Justice Department's conduct of pending mail fraud
proceedings and the delivery of a speech in the House favorable to the
Maryland bankers. Johnson's activities allegedly defrauded the United
States of "its right to have the lawful functions and duties of the defend-
ant.., free from corruption.... ."4 The remaining seven counts charged
that Johnson's intervention before the Justice Department violated
a conflict of interest statute.5 The jury found the defendant guilty on
all counts. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
speech or debate clause barred prosecution of a Congressman who
accepted a bribe to deliver a speech. The court therefore dismissed
the conspiracy count and ordered a new trial of the seven conflict of
interest counts on the theory that the introduction of evidence relating
1. U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 6.
2. United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 988
(1965).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
4. 337 F.2d 180, 184. The speech in issue was delivered on June 30, 1960. Johnson
declared in the course of defending Maryland's independent savings and loan industry
that:
I personally do not know any of these indicted institutions, nor any of the circum-
stances leading to their respective indictments. I hold no brief for any of them one
way or another....
I have sought in these remarks to be entirely objective with respect to the pros
and cons of this situation.
106 CONG. REc. 15258-15259 (1960).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1964) (formerly 62 Stat. 697 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1958).
6. United States v. Johnson, 215 F. Supp. 300 (D. Md. 1963).
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to the bribed speech prejudiced the jury's consideration of the con-
flict of interest charges.
The holding of the Court of Appeals was internally inconsistent.
Although the Court prohibited prosecution for receiving money to
make a speech, it allowed prosecution for receiving money to inter-
vene before the Justice Department. But in previous civil cases, courts
have broadly defined the protective scope of the constitutional pro-
vision as embracing "every ... act resulting from the nature, and in
the execution, of the office." Intervention before an executive depart-
ment is certainly in the nature and execution of the congressional
office.8 Therefore, if the free speech or debate clause had been invoked
in its accepted scope, all of the counts against Johnson should have
been dismissed. If Johnson leads to the use of the clause in its accepted
scope, then the case may be the first step in establishing a comprehen-
sive prohibition on criminal prosecutions of Congressmen.
The Fourth Circuit advanced five reasons in support of its decision.
First, the court looked to the origin of the clause in English constitu-
tional history as a protection for members of Parliament from punish-
ment by any agency other than Parliament itself. The second argument
supporting the decision was the impropriety of judicial inquiry
into the motives of legislators. Third, the court transferred the prin-
ciple of absolute immunity developed in libel and slander cases to the
context of criminal prosecution for bribery. A final pair of arguments
advanced by the Fourth Circuit was the possibility of abuse of execu-
tive prosecutorial discretion and the availability of legislative sanctions
by which Congress is able to punish its own members.
The court's construction of the free speech or debate clause began
with a consideration of the ancestry of the clause in the privilege of the
English Parliament to be free from outside influences which might
affect the course of debate or legislation.9 The evolution of the English
privilege mirrored the continuing constitutional struggle between
Crown and Parliament which culminated in the "Glorious Revolu-
tion." In the ninth article of the Bill of Rights which resulted, the
privilege received final statutory confirmation by a provision "that
the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought
7. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808); cited with approval in Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).
8. In applying 18 U.S.C. § 281, a court ruled in May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994, 1006
(D.C. Cir. 1949), that a Congressman who received compensation for his servlccs before
an agency was guilty of an illegal act even though he acted "... within the scope of
his official duties as a Congressman."
9. Wrrr, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIANENTARY PRIVILEGE 30 (1921).
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not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parlia-
ment." 10 In America, the colonial assemblies were patterned after the
English Parliament and claimed the privilege of free speech and
debate." Several state constitutions'-2 and the Articles of Confedera-
tion 13 incorporated the immunity, and the privilege was adopted
without opposition or meaningful debate at the Constitutional
Convention.' 4
Although the American speech or debate provision is the descendent
of the English privilege, the differing positions of Parliament and
Congress in their respective political systems has led to a divergence
of the privilege in the two countries. The absolute supremacy of the
English Parliament, particularly as reflected by its tradition as the
Highest Court of the Realm,5 has sharply limited judicial review,10
whereas the American Congress is but a coordinate branch of govern-
ment. When Parliament, for example, finds a breach of its privilege
that its speech or debate shall not be questioned, even in mere political
criticism,17 it can imprison the offender for contempt and no court can
10. 1 W. & M., c. 2, art. 9 (1688). Once the privilege received formal recognicion, the
Crown employed bribery to subvert a supposedly independent Parliament. Both William
III and Queen Anne increased the number of royal offices available for their support in
Parliament and made direct payments to members. SuMPKSS AND WRA I, CoRRuPwnON IN
DEvEL ourrRiu s 78 (1963). See generally AsoN, LAw AND Cusro.t OF rMI Co Nsrrru-
TiON 569-76 (5th ed. 1922). The system reached its peak under George III who resorted to
wholesale and public bribery to muster support for his colonial policy. SIPrS A.ND
WRAr, op. cit. supra at 82. In one famous instance, the King and his "bought" Parlia-
ment were arrayed against the electorate and a single member, John Wilkes, who had
attacked certain statements made by the Crown. In addition to prosecuting Wilkes for
libel, the King urged Parliament several times to expel Wilkes as the electorate continued
to return him as a member. WVrrrxE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 115-23. The incident indicates
in dramatic fashion that the bribery of members not only undermined the privilege but
also frustrated the representative character of Parliament. Historically, then, the bribery
of members was antithetical to the freedom of speech and debate in Parliament.
11. CLLAE, PARLi mNTARY PRivnxzE m nin As-mrc.N COLO.iEs 12 (1943).
12. MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. VIII (1776); l[Ass. Co.sr., part I, art. XXI
(1780); N.H. CONsr., part I, art. XXX (1784).
13. AicLaS OF CONFEDERATION, art. 5.
14. 2 FARRANi), THE REcoRns OF THE FEDmAL CoNInoN 254, 567, 593 (1937). Charles
Pinckney and Madison disagreed as to whether "provision should be made for ascertain-
ing by law the privileges of each house, rather than allowing each house to decide for
itself." BuTzNE, CONSTrruTONAL CHAEF 47 (1941).
15. IVrrE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 13.
16. "The decisions of the courts are not accepted as binding by the House in matters
of privilege, nor the decision of the House by the courts. Thus the old dualism remains
unresolved." MAY, THE LAw, PRIVILEGES, PROCErDINGS AND USAGE OF PAMLtkULr 173
(17th ed. 1964).
17. Thus the Speaker of the House of Commons recently found a "prima facie"
breach of privilege in a suggestion by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that certain
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review its decision.' 8 But the Supreme Court has declared that powers
and privileges of the House of Commons on the subject of contempt
have no application to the Congress.' 9 An act must obstruct the legis-
lative process before the Congress can invoke contempt power.20 And
even then there can be judicial review.2' The difference between Eng-
lish parliamentary privilege and congressional privilege suggests that
Parliament's historic reservation of the sole right to punish its members
for accepting bribes in the discharge of their office22 should not be
conclusive in determining whether courts should be denied jurisdiction
under the speech or debate clause of the American Constitution.
In two countries where provision for legislative free speech or debate
exists but where the legislature may not claim a tradition as the high-
est court of the realm,23 courts have held that the privilege does not bar
the criminal prosecution of legislators for bribery. Two Australian and
a single Canadian case posed the issue. Regina v. White24 held only
that an attempt to bribe a member of Parliament was a misdemeanor at
common law. But counsel for White had argued that since "the court
had no jurisdiction to inquire into the mode in which members of
Parliament voted, or their reasons for voting in any particular way,"
'28
it could not entertain a prosecution against one who offered to bribe a
legislator. In upholding White's conviction, the court dismissed the
argument of counsel and declared that a legislator who accepted a bribe
was guilty of a common-law offense. 26 In Rex v. Boston,2 7 an Australian
members represented financial interests. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1965, § E, p. 4, col. 1.
The mere threat to begin a libel action against a member may constitute a breach of
privilege. See Van Heuston, Parliamentary Privilege, in ESSAYS IN CONsrrTUTIONAL LAw 82,
95-98 (1964).
18. 1 ScHWARTZ, THE PowEas OF GOVERNMENT 124 (1963); Compare Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
19. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189 (1881).
20. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 148 (1935).
21. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
22. Parliament regards the act as inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege
of free speech or debate. MAY, op. cit. supra n.16, at 52, 115-116.
23. See Kielley v. Carson, 4 Moo. P.C. 63, 89, 13 Eng. Rep. 225, 235 (1842), per
Parke, B.,
[he reason why the House of Commons has this [broad contempt] power, is not
because it is a representative body with legislative functions, but by virtue of ancient
usage and prescription; the lex et consuetudo Parliamenti, which forms a part of
the Common Law of the land, and according to which the High Court of Parliament,
before its division, and the Houses of Lords and Commons since, are invested with
many peculiar privileges, that of punishing for contempt being one.
24. 13 N.S.W. Sup. Ct. 322 (1875).
25. Id. at 324.
26. Id. at 339.
27. 33 Commw. L.R. 386 (1923).
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court held that acceptance of money by a member of the legislative
assembly of New South Wales in exchange for a promise to induce the
government to purchase certain estates was a criminal offense. The
court accepted on principle the proposition that a legislator could be
prosecuted for a "bribed" vote.28 In the Canadian case, Regina v.
Bunting, 9 the defendants made the same claim as the defendants made
in Rex v. White, that the legislature had exclusive jurisdiction to pun-
ish anyone for bribing a legislator. Chief Justice Wilson, writing one
of two majority opinions, rejected this argument and also found the
"proposition very clear" that the courts have jurisdiction over a
member who accepts a bribe "in respect of any of his duties as a
member of [the] Assembly."'30 The refusal of these courts to recognize
the English privilege as a bar to criminal prosecution of legislators for
bribery suggests that this aspect of the privilege depends upon the
unique position and tradition of the English Parliament.
The Fourth Circuit supported its use of the English history by rely-
ing upon the doctrine of judicial deference to the motives of legisla-
tors. In recent years, this doctrine has cropped up in controversies
regarding the right of legislators to make accusations of subversive
activities.31 The leading case is Tenny v. Brandhove,32 in which the
plaintiff brought suit under a 1871 civil rights statute against the mem-
bers of a California Senate committee charged with investigating sub-
versive activities. A nearly unanimous court speaking through Justice
Frankfurter referred to the speech or debate clause in federal and state
constitutions in holding that Congress did not intend to make legisla-
tors liable for injuring a witness through committee investigation.m
The historic basis of the privilege was said to be the principle that "the
28. The dispute centered on whether Boston was acting as a legislator, as the indict-
ment charged, when he attempted to use his influence outside Parliament. Id. at 392.
29. 7 Ont. Rep. 524 (1885).
30. Id. at 542.
31. See generally Yankwich, Immunity of Congressional Speech, 99 U. P.. L. Rn. 960
(1951); and Oppenheim, Congressional Free Speech, 8 LoyoE. L. Rxv. (1956). For cases
which relate the privilege to legislative investigations, see Yellin v. United States, 374
U.S. 109, 122 (1963); and Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 19-18). cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948). Methodist Federation for Social Action v. Eastland, 141
F. Supp. 729, 731 (D.C.D.C. 1956).
32. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
33. Justice Frankfurter concluded his opinion with a caveat, emphasizing that his
discussion of the privilege applied only to the facts of that case. Id. at 378-79. Justice
Black concurred. Id. at 379. Justice Douglas, alone in dissent, urged: "It is one thing to
give great leeway to the legislative right of speech, debate and investigation. But when
a committee perverts its power . . . for [a] . . . corrupt purpose, the reason for the
immunity ends." Id. at 383.
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legislature must be free to speak and act without fear of criminal and
civil liability. '3 4 Frankfurter reasoned further that judicial deference
to the legislative branch supported the privilege even in the face of an
allegation of unworthy purpose:
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.
... The holding of this Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,
130 [1810], that it was not consonant with our scheme of govern-
ment for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has
remained unquestioned. 35
Therefore, the Court held that the privilege insulated the legislators
from liability for the conduct of the investigation.
The Fourth Circuit assumed that the theory of judicial deference
expressed in the Tenney opinion was applicable to the Johnson situa-
tion. The impropriety of judicial inquiry into the motives of legislators
is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine and dates back to the case
of Fletcher v. Peck36 in which Chief Justice Marshall refused to inquire
into the motives of a legislature whose members had allegedly been
bribed to secure passage of an act. Inquiry into the motives of legisla-
tors responsible for the enactment of a law is concededly inadvisable
(if not impossible) since the stability of statute law would be impaired
if the good or bad intentions of individual members became a criterion
for judging validity. The passage of a statute, moreover, is the work of
the legislature as a responsible branch of government about whose
operation assumptions of legitimacy should be made."' Deference to
the formal enactment of an institution does not, however, justify
similar respect for the motives of individual officials. 3s From a practical
standpoint, moreover, the insuperable difficulties of proof involved in
investigating the motives of representatives responsible for the enact-
ment of a statute are not duplicated when the object of investigation
is a single legislator.39 In deferring to the sanctity of legislative motive,
the Fourth Circuit failed to make the relevant discrimination between
an act of Congress and an act of one of its members.
An attitude of judicial deference is decidedly inappropriate when
34. Id. at 375.
35. Id. at 377, quoted in Johnson, 337 F.2d at 188-89.
36. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
37. BiciKEL, TIlE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 214 (1962).
38. See BLAcK, PERSPECrVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-5 (1963).
39. The undertaking is certainly easier than the discovery of the motives for a legisla.
tive investigation, a task which some members of the Supreme Court have not hesitated
to assume in recent years. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 153, 166 (1959);
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 429 (1961).
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Congress has directed the courts to exercise jurisdiction. For more than
one hundred years Congress has delegated to the courts the responsi-
bility for trying legislators accused of accepting bribes.4 0 And in the
1962 revision of the conflict of interest statutes 4' Congress responded
to increased national concern over the ethical standards of political
officials by reaffirnming and broadening this delegation of authority to
the courts.4
The third support for the Fourth Circuit's holding in Johnson
was the existing English and American case law which has applied
the privilege chiefly as a shield for legislators against libel and slander
40. A statute passed in 1853 declared a member "liable to indictment as for a high
crime and misdemeanor in any court of the United States" for accepting compensation
intended to influence a "vote or decision on any question ... brought before him in
his official capacity ...." Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171. A supporter of
the bill indicated in debate that a provision for forfeiture of office upon conviction
had been deleted because of doubts as to its constitutionality. 26 CoNG. GLOBE, 32d
Cong., 2d Sess. 392 (1855). But no member questioned the constitutionality of the criminal
provision. (The language of the statute reminds one of the juxtaposition of "high crime
or misdemeanor" with bribery found in U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 4-the impeachment pro-
vision-demonstrating, it would seem, the seriousness with which the framers of the
statute, at least, regarded the offense.)
The procurement frauds of the Civil War led Congress to enact two more statutes
dealing with the bribery of members. An 1862 statute, Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 180,
12 Stat. 577, which remained substantially unchanged until 1962, 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1958)
(now 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1964)) also delegated to the courts the power to punish venal
Congressmen. As Senator Roscoe Conkling noted in floor discussion of the measure, it
was intended to penalize legislators who received "pay for votes or influence in any
matter pending before Congress." 42 CONG. GLOBE pt. 4, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3260 (1862).
An 1864 conflict of interest statute, the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1958), barred
Congressmen from receiving compensation for their services before any agency. Act of
June 11, 1864, ch. 119, 13 Stat. 123 (now 18 US.C. § 203 (1964)). Although the question
of whether services rendered in Congress violate § 281 has not been resolved by the
courts, one commentator has pointed to the impressive policy argument that "Congress
could not have intended that its members . .. should be free to accept from private
sources compensation for lobbying in favor of private-interest legislation and claims in
the Congress... ." MANNING, JEDEPAL CoNrucr oF INTRzEsr LAw 63 (1964). These statutes
would seem to offer persuasive evidence of congressional intent to delegate to the courts
the responsibility for trying legislators accused of accepting bribes.
41. 76 Stat. 1119; 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-18 (1964). The revision followed upon a lengthy
study by an eminent committee of the New York City Bar, THE AssocuTioN or TmiEAR
OF =un Crry oF Nmv YoRK, CoNFucr oF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SEvica (1960), and reports
by committees of both Houses of Congress. H. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961);
S. Re. No. 2213, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
42. The new statute designates a member of Congress as a "public official" and
defines the "official act" in sweeping terms as:
any decision or action on any question . . .which may ... be brought before any
public official, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust....
18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1964). The language would seem to be as broad as the scope given to
the speech or debate clause.
1965]
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actions. Two leading English cases establish the broad immunity con-
ferred by the privilege against such suits. In Stockdale v. Hansard,48 the
Court of Queen's Bench held that the defendant, who published a libel-
ous report under order of the House of Commons, but who was not a
member of Parliament, could not avail himself of the privilege. The
Court also declared that:
For speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of
any other person, or hazardous to the public peace, the member
enjoys complete impunity.44
This frequently quoted dictum48 was reinforced by the decision in
Ex parte Wason.46 The Court of Queen's Bench there upheld a magis-
trate's refusal to issue an indictment against two peers for allegedly
conspiring to deceive the House of Lords by making false statements
concerning the author of a petition submitted to that body. "State-
ments made by members ... however injurious they might be to the
interest of a third person," 47 the Chief Justice said, could not be the
subject of a criminal prosecution.
The three leading American cases have also firmly established the
absolute immunity of congressional speech from libel or slander
actions. In Coffin v. Coffin,48 Chief Justice Parsons of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, while holding that the privilege did not protect a
member from a civil suit when the alleged slander was made in a casual
remark in the chamber of the legislature, declared that the privilege
ought to be construed liberally to embrace "every... act resulting from
the nature, and in the execution, of the [legislator's] office." 49 The
Supreme Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson 0 quoted with approval the
Massachusetts court's description of the privilege, and held that an
action for false imprisonment would not lie against a Congressman who
issued a report or voted for a contempt resolution. Finally, Cochran v.
Couzens51 held that words even if uttered maliciously need not be
pertinent or relevant to the subject before the chamber in order to fall
under the cloak of privilege.
43. 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1939). The decision was repealed one year
later by the Parliamentary Papers Act which gave summary protection to authorized
publishers of parliamentary papers. 3 & 4 Vict., c. 9.
44. Id. at 1156.
45. E.g., in United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d at 187.
46. 4 Q.B. 573 (1869); cf. Dillon v. Balfour, 20 L.R. Ir. 600 (1887).
47. 4 Q.B. at 576.
48. 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
49. Id. at 27.
50. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
51. 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874 (1930).
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In the language of the law of defamation, the speech or debate
clause establishes an absolute privilege, that is, an immunity which can-
not be overcome by showing of malice.52 Although the Constitution
incorporates only a legislative privilege of unquestioned speech or
debate, the common law traditionally extends an absolute immunity
from libel and slander actions to executive and judicial officials as
well.5 3 The immunity of judges from civil suits resulting from official
acts affords the earliest application of the rule.5 4 Executive officials,
including a naval commander, the Postmaster General, 0 and the
Attorney General,57 have successfully invoked the absolute privilege
as a defense to civil suit. And in a recent case, the Supreme Court indi-
cated the similarity of executive and legislative absolute privilege by
citing Tenney to support a holding that the director of the Office of
Rent Stabilization could announce with absolute immunity the suspen-
sion of subordinate employees for the misuse of funds. 8 Absolute
privilege, moreover, has not seen service solely at the federal level.
Many state constitutions contain provisions conferring immunity upon
the operations of their assemblies,59 and state courts have held absolute
privilege applicable not only to legislative but also to executive and
judicial proceedings at both the state 0 and local levels.0 '
52. Note, Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L REv. 875, 917-18 (1956).
For a statement of the distinction between absolute and qualified privilege, see Bigelow
v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 579, 37 N.E.2d 584, 588 (1941).
53. Courts often discuss absolute privilege in general terms, noting simply that a
constitutional provision protects legislators, e.g., Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163.
169-70, 129 A.2d 148, 151 (1957).
54. Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings,
9 COLUmN. L. Ray. 463, 483 (1909). It should be remembered that the English Parliament
originally claimed absolute privilege as the High Court of Parliament, see note 15, supra.
and that the colonial legislators have been described as little Parliaments because of
their pretensions to judicial authority. See note 11 supra. In this country the immunity
of judges from civil suit for official acts has long been recognized. Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913).
55. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
56. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
57. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
58. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).
59. Forty-one states have such a provision. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
375-76 n.5 (1951).
60. Van Riper v. Tumulty, 26 N.J. Misc. 37, 56 A.2d 611 (1948) (legislator); Matson
v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952) (attorney general); Ginger v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.V.2d 842 (1963) (circuit judge).
61. "'... the rule that publication of defamatory matter in the due course of legisla-
tive proceedings is absolutely privileged . .. includes all such proceedings, whether
federal, state or municipal." Larson v. Doner, 32 Ill. App. 2d 471, 178 N.E.2d 399, 401
(1961) (city mayor and commissioners); Shade v. Bowers, 199 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
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Despite the acceptance of the constitutional or common law absolute
privilege as a bar to civil actions against all officials, the privilege has
never, until Johnson, been invoked as a bar to criminal prosecution
for bribery. The absolute immunity from civil liability resulting from
the statements of federal judicial and executive officials does not
insulate them from criminal liability for their venal acts. 2 Similarly,
statutes in almost all states make the acceptance of compensation by
judicial, executive, or legislative officials 3 from private individuals a
criminal offense. The same states, as has been noted, have constitu-
tional provisions similar to the speech or debate clause in the United
States Constitution.
64
The reason the absolute privilege has not been extended to bar
criminal prosecutions for bribery is that the policy justifications under-
lying civil immunity do not apply to criminal prosecutions. The
justification for granting to officials an absolute immunity from libel
or slander actions is essentially the fear that honest speech might
become the basis of liability if a showing of malice could defeat the
privilege. Malice has been defined as "any improper motive" and as
falsifying with good motives. 5 Even if the defendant official possessed
an honest belief in the truth of what he has said, it has been held that a
showing of ill will or spite suffices to prove malice. Exaggeration or
1962) (village mayor and chief of police); Karelas v. Baldwin, 237 App. Dlv. 265, 261
N.Y.S. 518 (1932) (justice of the peace). Some courts do not extend the privilege to
subordinate legislative bodies or inferior executive officers. See generally, 1 HAIU'Ea &
JA Es, THE LAW OF ToaRs 428-39 (1956), and PRossmc, ToRTs 800-03 (3rd ed. 1964).
62. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938) (defendant was the Senior
Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). Fall v.
United States, 49 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 867 (1931) (Secretary of the
Interior). The Constitution also makes it clear that such officials are not immune from
prosecution. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3.
63. Just as absolute privilege extended first to judicial officials, early state court
decisions indicate that the common law conception of bribery was originally limited
to corruption in the administration of justice. Cf. Commonwealth v. Funk, 314 Ky. 282,
284-85, 234 S.W.2d 957, 959 (1950); People v. Patillo, 386 I11. 566, 572-73, 54 N.E.2d 548,
551-52 (1944). The modem definition extends to all officials concerned with the ad-
ministration of government, including legislators. PaKINS, CRIAHNAL LAW 398 (1957).
For an enumeration of the states which provide by statute that the acceptance of com-
pensation by legislators from private individuals is a criminal offense, see United States
v. Johnson, 215 F. Supp. 300, 306-07 n.6 (1963).
64. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375-76 n.5 (1951). State legislators have
never raised the privilege as a defense to a bribery prosecution. Sims v. State, 131 Ark.
185, 198 S.W. 883 (1917) (vote); People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 84 Pac. 864 (1905)
(investigation); People v. Logie, 321 Mich. 303, 32 N.W.2d 458 (1948) (committee vote);
State v. Ivanhoe, 238 Mo. App. 200, 177 S.V.2d 657 (1944) (vote); Cox v. State, 166 Tex.
Crim. 587, 316 S.W.2d 891 (1958) (vote).
65. 1 HAiwEm & JAMEs. op. cit. supra note 61, at 452.
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vehemence of language, moreover, may furnish evidence of ill will.co
And most troublesome of all, a jury may find that an absence of reason-
able grounds for belief in the truth of a statement, however genuine
that belief may have been, satisfies the requirements of malice. 7 Thus,
broad definitions of malice and the difficulty of controlling juries
necessitate an absolute immunity from libel and slander actions if non-
malicious speech is not to be deterred.
Before the absolute immunity developed in defamation cases can be
invoked as a bar to criminal prosecution, 8 it must appear that the
possibility of criminal prosecution for bribery would inhibit honest
speech. The dampening effect of amenability to criminal prosecution
depends upon the extent to which a Congressman proceeding in good
faith will be deterred by either the possibility of conviction or by the
threat of a politically motivated indictment.
The possibility of an innocent Congressman being convicted for
bribery is less than the possibility of a well-meaning Congressman
being found liable for malicious defamation. The standard of proof is,
of course, more stringent in the criminal case: a mere preponderance
of evidence will not suffice. The prosecutor must prove the elements of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 And in a bribery prosecution,
in contrast to an action for malicious defamation, the speech alone may
not be the basis for liability; the inquiry focuses on whether the speech
was given in return for compensation.
70
66. Newark Trust Co. v. Bruwer, 51 Del. (I Storey) 188, 141 A.2d 615 (1958); Puossm,
op. cit. supra note 61, at 822.
67. 1 HIARuR & JAms, op. cit. supra note 61, at 453.
68. The Fourth Circuit was mistaken in its basic assumption that Johnson could have
invoked an absolute privilege in a hypothetical libel or slander action. Inquiry into
motive is permissible in libel actions against Congressmen who have distributed copies
of the allegedly libellous speech, for only a qualified privilege attaches to statements
which a Congressman disseminates for his private use. "[The absolute privilege to inform
a felow legislator ... becomes a qualified privilege for the republication of the informa-
tion .... Congressmen ... are liable for malicious defamation, for the unofficial dissemina-
tion of the Congressional Record." AfcGovem v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 347-48 (D.D.C.
1960). See also Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386, 389 (dictum), aJ'd, 293 US. 76 (1934); The
King v. Creevy, 1 if. & S. 273, 105 Eng. Rep. 102 (LB. 1813).
In Johnson, evidence indicated that the defendant-Congressman caused the distribution
of 50,000 copies of his speech to customers of the Maryland savings and loan companies.
Thus, if it were suitable to transfer the principles of libel and slander cases to the John.
son situation, the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize the principle appropriate for transfer.
69. A trial judge must direct a verdict for the accused if he believes that the jury
could not reasonably find that the evidence of the prosecution excluded "every other
hypothesis but that of guilt." Isbell v. United States, 227 Fed. 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1915).
Cf. United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion of
Frank, J.).
70. Under the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. 281, it was held that an innocent motive for
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Of course, a vaguely defined offense might inhibit honest congres-
sional speech and might therefore necessitate application of the princi-
ple of absolute immunity developed in defamation cases. A vague
statute allows the prosecutor latitude to define the offense.7 1 This
discretion amplifies the danger of politically motivated prosecutions.
Also, the imprecise nature of an offense could make a conviction much
easier to obtain. For example, the indictment involving Congressman
Johnson's speech was brought under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the "Conspiracy
to Defraud the United States" statute. Under this statute an agreement
to accomplish any fraudulent purpose constitutes, without more, the
foundation for criminal liability72 The usual requirement of proving
an act in addition to a criminal intent is undercut by the need of
proving only an agreement in conspiracy prosecutions."8 The Fourth
Circuit, therefore, would have been justified in finding that the deter-
rent effect resulting from the vagueness of the conspiracy statute
warranted application of the principle of absolute immunity developed
in defamation cases.
Using similar reasoning, the court should also have invalidated the
prosecution under the conflict of interest statute for intervention
before the Justice Department. The speech or debate clause should
encompass all the representative functions which a modem Congress-
man performs.1 4 Although speech is classically the basic element of the
legislative process, today it may be less significant than a Congressman's
accepted practice of interceding before government agencies on behalf
of his constituents, to obtain or provide information, to press for
change in policy, and generally to perform a supervisory function.71
If the constitutional provision covers intervention before the Justice
Department as well as speech, the vagueness analysis which supports the
invalidation of the conspiracy prosecution also supports invalidating
the prosecution under the conflict of interest statute. This statute, 18
U.S.C. § 281, fails to define an offense which predicates guilt upon
an act would not exculpate the defendant if he accepted compensation for Its perform-
ance since "criminal intent . . . may be found from the circumstances ...... McGregor
v. United States, 134 Fed. 187, 195-98 (4th Cir. 1904). If similar reasoning is pursued
in the speech situation, good motives for the delivery of a speech would be Irrelevant
if compensation prompted its delivery.
71. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 67, 88 (1960).
72. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 406 (1959).
73. Id. at 407-12.
74. Such an expansion of the privilege would make its scope no broader than It
already is in civil actions for libel and slander. See text accompanying note 7, supra.
75. GRoss, Tim L sSLATivx STRUGGLE 136-37 (1953).
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concrete acts. The conflict of interest statute (and its modern succes-
sor)76 allows conviction for an agreement to receive compensation even
when the bribed service has not been performed and even when con-
sideration has not passed.77 Thus the statute leaves the jury free to
convict essentially upon evidence of intent only. Standards for proof
of intent are rather uncertain, and a Congressman might fear legiti-
mately that honest conduct could be misinterpreted. Every conversa-
tion with a constituent interested in having his Congressman support
legislation or urge change in executive policy could be suspect.
Although the Fourth Circuit would have been justified in holding
that existing criminal statutes afford juries, and consequently prose-
cutors, latitude inconsistent with the free speech or debate clause, the
court was not justified in finding a comprehensive constitutional pro-
hibition on bribery prosecutions. This holding prevents Congress from
providing for any prosecution of bribed speech, irrespective of the
degree of precision with which Congress defines the elements of the
offense. Admittedly, the difficulty of defining bribery in the legislative
context is greater than in the area of executive conflict of interest.78
The indispensability of campaign funds and the pressures of constitu-
ents combine to blur the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate
action.7  However, the definition of the offense of bribery need not
rest upon vague evidentiary foundations. A precise definition of
bribery could require proof of a concrete and complete transaction.
Conviction of the offense could be predicated upon proof of the
passage of consideration and the performance of a service in addition
to an agreement binding the bribee to act. The possibility of a tight
definition of bribery which would sharply reduce discretion afforded
76. 18 U.S.C. § 203 (1964). The statute imposes punishment on an official who "receives
or agrees to receive. . . any compensation for any services rendered or to be rendered."
The Government could have indicted Johnson for the speech under the bribery statute,
18 U.S.C. § 205 (1958), which has since been incorporated into a more general statute
applying to all federal officials, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1964). But these statutes present
vagueness problems similar to those encountered under the conflict of interest provision.
77. The statute seems so plain on its face that it would be difficult to read it other-
wise, although no convictions have been found in which defendants performed neither
the act of rendering services nor that of receiving compensation. See generally MANNLNG,
F ER. CoN.Icr or INIs LAw 38-39, 45 (1964).
78. See Sutcomm., SENATE Cotmr. ON LABOR AND Puauc WELFARE, 82O CONG., Isr
Srss., REPORT ON ETHICAL STANDARDS IN GovERzswr 19-83 (Comm. Print 1951); and with
particular reference to the problems of legislators. DoucLAs, Erutes IN GovEm.,ENTr
64-96 (1952).
79. The problem has not escaped congressional concern. E.g., Hearings Before the
Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contribu-
tions, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 980-82 (1956-57).
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under existing statutes indicates that there need not be an absolute
immunity to bribery prosecutions.
The fourth argument advanced by the Court of Appeals-the
possibility of abuse of executive discretion through the initiation of
groundless indictments-also fails to justify its sweeping rationale.
Although a more precise definition of the offense would not affect a
prosecutor's discretion to initiate groundless indictments, this irreduc-
ible minimum of prosecutorial discretion does not justify the court's
construction of the speech or debate clause. First, the threat of criminal
prosecution is a clumsy device for intimidating Congressmen. More
subtle techniques are available such as the threat to disclose publicly
the peccadillos of a Congressman's private life. Second, there is no
tradition of congressional immunity from criminal prosecution. 0
Third, administrative officials are reluctant to tangle with Congress-
men, even where the enforcement of criminal statutes is involved.81
Finally, the threat of a groundless indictment upon a Congressman's
chances of reelection should not be exaggerated.8 2 The inevitable dis-
cretion of a prosecuting official to initiate groundless prosecutions is
present under every statute and it appears doubtful that this discretion
is an effective deterrent to honest congressional speech.
The fifth round of decision relied upon by the Fourth Circuit-the
availability of legislative sanctions-justifies neither the result in the
particular case nor the court's sweeping rationale. The availability of
legislative sanctions does not imply that these sanctions are exclusive.8"
80. The spectre of a runaway executive seems never to have been raised. United
States v. Quinn, 141 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (granted motion for acquittal on the
ground that the defendant, as a -member of Congress, did not know of the receipt of
fees by his law firm). Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 544 (1906) (upheld the con-
viction of a Senator for accepting compensation to intervene before the Post Office
Department); United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 676 (C.C.D. Neb. 1904) (held that statute
did not prevent senator-elect from accepting payment to procure office for another).
In May v. United States, see supra note 8, a court upheld the conviction of the Chair-
man of the House Armed Services Committee for accepting compensation to intervene
before the War Department in an effort to obtain contracts for his patron. The Indictment
of a prestigious committee chairman certainly strikes at the "independence" of that official
in most direct fashion; yet the Court in May declined to invoke the hobgoblin of a run-
away executive.
81. GROSS, op. cit. supra note 75, at 41.
82. Although Johnson was indicted three weeks before the general election of 1962, he
was barely defeated. Brief for Appellant, p. 7, United States v. Johnson, 57 F.2d 180
(4th Cir. 1964). An indictment may even serve to rally a Congressman's constituents to
his side, as illustrated by the classic case of James Michael Curley. WILSON, CoNGREss:
CoRRuvrION AND COMPROMISE 75-79 (1951).
85. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 provides: "Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence
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In fact Congress itself hesitates to exercise its powers of censure or of
expulsions and instead provides for judicial proceedings. This prefer-
ence is easily understood. A trial in a court affords the accused Con-
gressman the benefit of constitutional guarantees. When a legislative
body sits in judgment, the definition of the offense, the standard of
proof,85 and the propriety of a given procedure 0 is a matter for its
discretion. Moreover, there exists always the inevitable political colora-
tion assumed by any legislative effort to discipline its members,8T
undoubtedly persuaded the Congress to provide a judicial forum.ts
of two-thirds, expel a Member." Counsel for a United States Senator convicted of
accepting compensation to intervene before an executive agency unsuccessfully urged
that this clause implied an exclusive jurisdiction. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344
(1906). The Court, while conceding that a senator could not be forced to vacate his seat
upon conviction, declared:
there is no necessary connection between the conviction of a Senator of a public
offense prescribed by statute and the authority of the Senate ....
Id. at 367. Similarly, although Congress invokes the aid of the courts to punish re-
calcitrant wimesses, it retains its own sanction of contempt proceeding. Jumey v. Mac-
Cracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935).
84. Congress has tried expulsion only eighteen times and most of these attempts
were directed against Southern Congressmen in the days immediately preceding World
War II. Oppenheim, Congressional Free Speech, 8 LOYOLA L. RE%. 1, 27 (1956). Perhaps
because of a reluctance to disrupt the atmosphere of the "club," Congressmen have,
for the most part, scrupulously refrained from investigating allegations of corruption in
their midst. WILSON, op. cit. supra note 82, at 3. The House of Representatives has
usually declined to act even against members indicted for felony and indeed has not
hesitated to appoint them to committees. H.R. Doc. No. 374, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Co.-
srriroN, JEFFERSON's M.NUA. AND RULES OF TnE HOUSE OF REFRE.%,TATzvEs 133 (Dechsler
ed. 1965). And while Rule VIII of that chamber provides that every representative
"shall vote on each question put, unless he has a personal or pecuniary interest in the
event of such question," M.R. Doc. No. 374, supra at 318, only on very rare occasions
has the Speaker enforced the rule, nor have members sought to extend its force to
official action other than voting. GRoss, op. cit. supra note 74, at 40.
85. "The right to expel," the Supreme Court has asserted, "extends to all cases where
the offense is such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and
duty of a Member." In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1897).
86. In a 1795 contempt of Congress proceeding before the House, members opined
"there was no obligation to permit counsel although it might be done as a favor."
2 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE oF REPRESENTATIVES § 1601, at 1050 (1907). Congres-
sional jurors with predisposed views are not subject to challenge. Id. at § 1618, at 1086.
And today television cameras create additional hazards for the accused whereas they are
not permitted in federal courts in criminal proceedings. FED. R. Ciut.& P. 53. See also
A.B.A. CANONS OF JuD. ETmcs 35. For a contrast between the judicial and legislative
procedure see Boldt, Should Canon 35 of the Code of Judicial Ethics Be Revised?, 16
F.R.D. 83 (1956); Tinkham, The Bar and Canon 35, 19 F.R.D. 19 (1957).
87. The late President Kennedy noted that in the most famous legislative trial held
in this country, the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, "The chief interest was not in
the trial or the evidence, but in the tallying of votes necessary for conviction." KEN:4NEY.
PROFILES IN COURAGE 113 (1957).
88. As one senator has written, concerning the handling of legislative corruption,
1965]
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Although the Court of Appeals in Johnson would have been justified
in dismissing all the counts against Johnson because they were brought
under impermissibly vague statutes, the five arguments advanced by
the Fourth Circuit do not support its construction of the free speech
or debate clause as a comprehensive prohibition on any congressional
attempt to subject its members to prosecution for bribery. The John-
son rationale infuses an incongrous dimension into a constitutional
privilege designed to promote the independence of legislators.
d . . civil rights will be better safeguarded and criminal justice will be more
stringently applied if Congress encourages the courts and the prosecutors to handle
these matters.
Quoted in WH.soN, op. cit. supra note 81, at 250. In its recent decision that § 504 of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 amounted to a bill of
attainder, the Supreme Court discussed extensively this inherent unsuitability of tile
legislature as a place of trial. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-46 (1965).
